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It is also worth noting that on the intermediate embodiment view a "res
urrection" is the glorification of an already existing and living body. In
no sense is it a rising from the grave. This is ironic given Corcoran's sug
gestion that contemporary dualists have neglected or misunderstood the
meaning of 'resurrection.'
One of the principal ideas of the chapter is that the biblical case for du
alism is not as straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. That is a point
well worth making. Though a dualist interpretation can be defended, the
anthropological teaching of the text (if any) is not entirely explicit. But it
is also true that the materialist alternatives, and the intermediate embodi
ment view in particular, face some serious challenges.
Overall, R ethin kin g H um an N ature is an excellent entry to current Chris
tian reflection on the relation between mind and body, as well as the sur
rounding ethical and theological issues. It engages the reader, succinctly
covers a wide range of arguments, and exemplifies thoughtful and care
ful reflection from a thoroughly Christian perspective. Corcoran does not
pretend that all readers will be convinced by the case for the constitution
view, but he offers his audience an appealing invitation to take it serious
ly. For many students and non-specialists, R ethin kin g H um an N ature will
be the best available introduction to an important facet of contemporary
thinking on mind and body.

Providence, Evil and the O penness o f God, by William Hasker. Routledge,

2004. Pp. 224. $130 (hardback).
DOLORES G. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame
"How does God run the world?" How can we account for "the prevalence
of evil in a world supposedly governed by a God who is wise, good, and
powerful?" (p. 1) In Providence, Evil and the O penness o f God, William Hasker
offers a series of reflections based largely upon these questions. Each chap
ter of this volume is a stand-alone essay, though all are united by one cen
tral theme: the superiority of open theism over rival conceptions of divine
providence with respect to both the problem of evil and the existence of
libertarian free will.
This volume is divided into two parts. The five essays in Part One com
prise a discussion of the problem of evil; these essays deal very little with
the differences among competing accounts of divine providence, but focus
instead on the beliefs shared by most traditional theists. Hasker spends al
most no time on the logical problem of evil, referring the reader to Alvin
Plantinga's Free-Will Defense. Instead, the focus here is on the evidential
problem of evil, "the version which claims that God's existence is im prob
able given the evidence of evil." (p. 24)
Prior to the discussion of the evidential problem, however, is an essay
pertaining to the existential problem of evil. This version of the problem is
articulated in the form of m oral protest against a God who would create a
world in which suffering is prevalent. In chapter one, "On regretting the
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evils of this world," Hasker argues that few people, theists or atheists,
could consistently raise such a protest.
In this fascinating, carefully argued essay, Hasker explicates our no
tions of "gladness" and "regret" into what he calls a "logic of preference."
He distinguishes circum stantial gladness, where you are glad about some
state of affairs P but regret some Q which you know to be necessary for P,
from being g lad on the w hole . He defines the latter as follows:
'A is glad on the whole that P' =df 'A is glad that P, and for any stateof-affairs Q such that A knows that if Q did not obtain neither would
P, A is glad that Q.' (p. 14)1
Armed with this distinction, Hasker goes on to note the massive historic
contingency of the existence of any given person.2 Assuming with Kripke
that "personal identity requires an identical gen etic heritage ," any signifi
cant change in our history is likely to have resulted in a very different
population (p. 11).3 Thus, if I am glad on the w hole about my own existence,
or about the existence of those that I love, then I must be glad about the
history of the world having been as it has (p. 15). But I cannot consistently
com plain about that which I am g lad about! Therefore, Hasker concludes,
If I am glad on the whole about my own existence, and that of per
sons close to me, then I cannot reproach God for the general character
or the major events of the world's past history. (p. 19)
This is, of course, to say that I cannot consistently raise the existential
problem of evil.
I believe that Hasker is right about this; if I am glad on the whole of my
own existence, then I cannot consistently complain about any of the atroci
ties which may have been necessary for my own coming-into-existence.4
The trouble, as they say, is that one man's m odus ponens is another's m odus
tollen s . Hasker takes this argument to preclude most of us (the atheologian included) from raising the existential problem of evil. As I see it, the
argument demonstrates that very few of us can be glad on the whole of
our own existence.5 Consider in particular the atheologian who wishes to
raise the existential problem of evil. Will he conclude, with Hasker, that
he must prefer the Holocaust, the early American slave-trade, the influ
enza pandemics, and whatever else might be necessary for his own existence—simply because he is glad on the whole about his own existence?6
I think that he will not. Instead, he will likely conclude that he can be
at best circu m stan tially glad about his own existence. But circumstantial
gladness does not require that he be glad about the circumstances neces
sary for his own existence, and so the atheologian will remain perfectly
capable of raising the existential problem of evil without running the risk
of inconsistency.
The remaining chapters in part one address the evidential problem of evil.
Central to the discussion is Hasker's claim that a wholly good God, contrary
to traditional theistic belief, could an d should allow for the existence of evil
that is genuinely gratuitous. In chapter two, "Suffering, soul-making and
salvation," Hasker offers what he takes to be the most promising theodicy
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in light of the evidential problem of evil. This chapter also includes a dis
cussion of theodicy in general, as well as a critical evaluation of Eleonore
Stump's theodicy of "suffering for redemption"(p. 23).7 Ultimately, Hasker
concludes that a variant of John Hick's soul-making theodicy is "an ad
equate solution for the problem of inflicted moral and natural evil"(p. 40).8
Chapter three, "The sceptical solution of the problem of evil," focuses on
a particular theistic response to William Rowe's famous formulation of the
evidential problem of evil.9 Here Hasker, drawing on the work of Richard
Swinburne, emphasizes the danger of appealing to our epistemic limita
tions in order to deny the existence of gratuitous evil.10 Instead, he suggests
that the theist reconsider her support for the following premise:
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally
bad or worse. (p. 43)
In rejecting this premise, and accepting the fact that God might allow gra
tuitous evils to occur, the theist is free to reject the conclusion of Rowe's
evidential argument from evil.
The two succeeding chapters continue this theme. Chapter four ("The
necessity of gratuitous evil") offers an argument for the claim that God
must not prevent the occurrence of all such evils if His creatures are to be
endowed with libertarian freedom. Chapter five, "Can God permit 'just
enough' evil?" furthers this point, concluding that "theists should reject
the idea that God must prevent all gratuitous evil" (p. 91).
In part two, the focus shifts to competing accounts of divine provi
dence. Here, Hasker considers the relative impact of atheistic arguments
from evil upon each of these accounts. The bulk of the discussion con
cerns Molinism, Theological Determinism, and Open Theism, but Process
Theism is addressed here as well. In chapter six, "The openness of God,"
Hasker offers a broad presentation of the "open" view of God. Beginning
with a brief account of his own conversion to open theism, he details the
basic commitments of this "risk-taking" conception of God and addresses
some of the more common objections to this position.
In chapters seven and eight, Hasker compares Open Theism both to Molinism and to Theological Determinism. Chapter seven, "Providence and
Evil," is an evaluation of each theory in light of two features: their ability to
ground an adequate theodicy for the evidential problem of evil, and their
ability to make sense of genuine divine-human dialogue. Here Hasker con
cludes that Open Theism is in the best position with respect to both of
these tasks. In chapter eight, "The God who takes risks," Hasker further
advances the position that open theism offers the most promising account
of divine providence available to Christian theists. He maintains that the
risk-taking nature ascribed to God on such an account, often assumed to
be a liability of open theism, is in fact a benefit, for it enables the open theist
both to do justice to the emotional language attributed to God in scripture
and to avoid the "dark paradoxes of theological determinism" (p. 134).
In chapter nine, "The problem of evil in process theism and classical
free-will theism," the discussion broadens to include process theism.
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Here, Hasker considers the claim that process theism is better equipped to
handle the problem of evil than are the more traditional theistic accounts
of providence, and concludes that open theism—unlike Molinism and
Theological Determinism—possesses no disadvantage in this regard.
In chapter ten, "antinomies of divine providence," the focus returns to
the three primary accounts of divine providence. Central to this chapter is
the apparent tension between divine sovereignty and creaturely freedom,
though a version of the Grounding Objection to Molinism is raised here as
well. Finally, in chapter eleven, Hasker considers the traditional Christian
belief that God is perfectly good in light of the (equally traditional) belief
that creation was a free act of God. Much of this discussion centers upon a
recent dialogue between William Rowe and Thomas Morris.11 Taking this
dialogue as his starting point, Hasker suggests that Christians re-evaluate
their conception of God's goodness. By emphasizing "the intrinsic excel
lence of his holy and gracious love," Hasker believes that the apparent
constraints imposed upon God's freedom by His goodness can be shown
to be illusory (p. 184).
This book concludes with an appendix entitled "Replies to My Critics."
The appendix begins with a continuation of Hasker's arguments against
both Molinism and the "simple foreknowledge" account of providence.
The bulk of the appendix, however, consists of a defense of open theism
against recently formulated objections.
Throughout part two of this volume, Hasker's rejection of Molinism
plays a central role in advancing the position that Open Theism offers the
best account of providence available to the traditional Christian theist.12At
the heart of Hasker's rejection of Molinism is the Grounding Objection.13In
response to this objection, Hasker writes, "Some Molinists have counterat
tacked, claiming that the grounding objection is without force because the
requirement for grounding has not been given a precise enough formula
tion" (p. 194). For this reason, in the appendix, Hasker offers a precise for
mulation of the grounding requirement. I would like, briefly, to evaluate
Hasker's grounding requirement, and to provide a defense of Molinism in
light of Hasker's proposal.
Hasker begins by defining a "concrete state or event" as "the exem plifi
cation o f an occurrent property by a substance at a time, or o f an occurrent rela
tion by two or m ore substances at a tim e " (p. 195). His proposed grounding

principle, then, is as follows:
(GP) A n y true contingent proposition is true in virtue o f the existen ce or n on
existence o f som e concrete state or event. (p. 195)
Hasker follows his grounding principle with a few clarifying comments,
not all of which are relevant for our purposes.14 One comment that I deem
crucial to the discussion is as follows. Hasker asks,
Why must we allow grounding to consist in the non-existence of a
state or event? The answer is that "non-existence" needs to be in
cluded in order to account for negative and universal propositions.
The truth of "All crows are black" depends on the non-existence of
crows which are not black. (p. 195)15
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He continues,
The fundamental idea behind this requirement is that contingent
propositions are descriptive of the actual state of the world; in order
for such a proposition to be true, the world must be as the proposi
tion says it is. And this must take the form of one or more concrete
objects having properties or standing in relations (or failing to do so);
no situation involving m erely abstract en tities can m ake a contingent prop
osition tru e . (p. 195, emphasis added)

I have chosen to include both of these quotations in their entirety for the
following reason: I have great difficultly understanding how we are to rec
oncile the appeal to non-existent crows in the former quotation with the
subsequent requirement that truths be grounded in concrete objects.
I imagine that we are all agreed that there are no non-existent crows.
In his treatment of Molinism in chapter seven, Hasker considers God's
knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom pertaining to possible, non
actual creatures. He writes, "Since there are no creatures that don't exist,
this knowledge strictly speaking concerns uninstantiated essences" (p. 163,
fn. 7). These essences, uninstantiated or instantiated, are presumably what
Hasker intends to exclude by insisting upon the concrete nature of the
states or events that ground contingent truths. Why, then, is it acceptable
to appeal to the non-existence of some concrete state or event? What is it for
a concrete event to fa il to exist ?
The problem here is not a new one. In "A World of States of Affairs,"
David Armstrong refers to the "vexed question whether or not to ad
mit n egative states of affairs."16 In Herbert Hochberg's review of Arm
strong's book by the same title, he finds fault with Armstrong's attempt to
"ground true negations by positive facts" (p. 482).17 Hochberg concludes
that Armstrong implicitly relies upon "categorical properties, or 'quid
dities'" (p. 482). The message is clear: grounding negative and universal
truths in concrete events or states of affairs is no simple task. It is possible
that Hasker has an account whereby this can be done, but if so this ac
count has not yet been given.
If Hasker's (GP) is true, then it seems likely that there can be no true
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. However, absent some account of
how it is that concrete states or events can fa il to exist , or how non-existent
objects can stand in relations, it seems equally likely that there can be no
true universal or negative facts. Yet there are true universal and negative
facts. For this reason, I maintain that the Molinist need not be troubled
by Hasker's Grounding Principle. In being unable to meet the require
ments of this principle, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are in good
company.
P rovidence, E vil an d the O penness o f G od is an impressive collection of es
says covering a wide range of material. However, while the chapters are
thematically unified, the structure of the work as a whole is a bit disap
pointing. There is a great deal of overlap between the chapters, and little
to no acknowledgement of, or reference to, material outside of any given
chapter. This is, perhaps, to be expected from a collection of essays. How
ever, it can be disorienting as a reader to be introduced, for example, to
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both the problem of evil and open theism in chapter nine, 138 pages into a
detailed discussion of both themes.18The appendix offers much that is new,
b u t-g iv e n the nature of an appendix—the arguments offered here are
quite cursory. Every essay in this volume is undoubtedly worth reading,
but I look forward to seeing the synthesis of these earlier essays with the
newer material, rather than simply being given the essays themselves.
In a similar vein, some of the essays contained in this volume were
originally directed at a more general audience. As such, Hasker occasion
ally alludes to “technical problems" with formulating a criterion precisely,
and "technical philosophical reasons" for terminology, in ways that the
philosophical audience at which this volume is aimed will find unsatisfac
tory (pp. 80, 103, fn13).
These quibbles aside, there is much to recommend in Providence, Evil
and the Openness o f God. "The freedom and goodness of God," is new to this
volume and, I think, one of the most interesting and thought-provoking es
says here. Additionally, the appendix contains a great deal of new material
that any reader is sure to find challenging and insightful. The remaining
chapters may not contain much that is new, but they are certainly replete
with arguments, illustrations and assertions that will undoubtedly provoke
continued (perhaps heated) discussion among philosophers of religion.
NOTES
1. "In order to avoid use-mention confusions I will use 'P' to stand for
the sentence which expresses the proposition that P, and 'P' as the name of the
state of affairs such that P" (p. 20). I will follow Hasker's lead throughout this
review.
2. He appeals to the following principle here: "A necessary condition of
my coming-into existence is the coming-into existence of my body" (p. 11).
Hasker notes that not everyone will accept this principle. (I myself am inclined
to reject this principle, but will grant it for the purposes of this review.)
3. Indeed, Hasker notes that "even genetic identity is not sufficient: iden
tical twins are not identical persons" (p. 11 ).
4. Of course, as Hasker notes, I do not technically know that these atroci
ties were necessary for my own coming-into existence. Still, I have no reason
to believe that I would have existed had these atrocities not occurred. Thus,
Hasker writes, "What I have no reason to suppose true must for practical pur
poses be disregarded" (p. 15).
5. This may be too presumptuous; really, I think that most people should
not be glad on the whole of their own existence. I cannot, and I'd like to think
that most people—upon reflection—would find themselves in a similar situa
tion. However, because the reflections must be conducted from the first-person
perspective, I cannot be certain of how others will respond.
6. The Holocaust is surely an inflammatory example, but I believe it to be
a fair one as well. In my own case, I am fairly confident that the Holocaust was
necessary for my own existence. It seems plausible that, had Hitler's actions
been less atrocious, the US would not have entered into WWII. Prior to WWII,
my maternal grandfather was engaged to marry a woman who is decidedly
not my grandmother. When he went to war, she married someone else. So, for
me at least, the odds of having come into existence absent the Holocaust are
not so good. Nevertheless, I am not the slightest bit inclined to prefer the oc
currence of the Holocaust to its non-occurrence, despite the fact that I am very
happy to be alive.

356

Faith and Philosophy

7. Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985),
pp. 392-423.
8. John Hick, Evil and the God o f Love (New York, NY: Harper and Row,
1996; revised edition 1978).
9. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," in The Evidential
Argument from Evil, ed. Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1996).
10. Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem o f Evil (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1994).
11. William Rowe, “The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom" in
Reasoned Faith, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993),
pp 223-33. See also “The Problem of No Best World," Faith and Philosophy 11:2
(April 1994), pp 269-71; and “Can God Be Free?" Faith and Philosophy 19:4 (Oc
tober 2002) pp. 405-24; Thomas Morris, “Perfection and Creation" in Reasoned
Faith, ed. Eleonore Stump, pp. 234-47.
12. For example, in “The God Who Takes Risks" (Chap. 8) Hasker assumes
that Molinism cannot address the grounding objection and so does not take it
to be a viable alternative to Open Theism. He thus concludes, contra Molinism, that any theistic account according to which creatures are endowed with
libertarian freedom will be an account on which God takes risks (pp. 125-26).
In Chap. 10, “Antinomies of Divine Providence," Hasker grants that Molinism, as opposed to Open Theism and Theological Determinism, is initially in
the best position to reconcile divine sovereignty with creaturely freedom. He
again rejects Molinism on the basis of the Grounding Objection (pp. 153-58).
13. Briefly stated, the objection runs as follows: “Molinism might do a great
job of balancing the freedom of creatures with the sovereignty of God, but it
simply cannot be true. God cannot have Middle Knowledge; He cannot know
which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are the true ones, because there
are no such truths. There is nothing in virtue of which these counterfactuals
could be true; they are groundless, and as such are neither true nor false." In
the interest of space, and given the scope of this review, I will operate on the
assumption that the reader is familiar with the relevant background material
here. I refer the reader to Thomas Flint's Divine Providence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998) for an accessible yet comprehensive account and de
fense of Molinism.
14. Hasker defends (a) the limitation of this principle to contingent propo
sitions, and (b) the insistence upon occurrent properties, entailed by his defini
tion of concrete events, on page 195.
15. It is also important to note, as Hasker does, that “existence" here is to
be taken trans-temporally (p. 195).
16. Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 7, Language and Logic (1993), pp. 429-40 at
436.
17. D. M Armstrong, A World o f States o f Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); Herbert Hochberg, “D. M Armstrong, A World of
States of Affairs," Nous 33:3 (1999), pp. 473-95.
18. A more dramatic example: chapter four is entitled “The necessity of
gratuitous evil." There, Hasker defends the claim that God must allow for evil
that is in some sense gratuitous; it is not possible for God only to allow for
“just enough" evil to ensure some great good. Chapter five, “Can God permit
'just enough' evil?" makes the very same claim and, oddly enough, does so as
if the arguments of the previous chapter had not yet been raised.

